"rules of the game", as it were) are clearly crucial to the outcome of market interaction. In a world where economic agents are electronic, mechanisms can take forms never before used, and the intuitions of Game Theorists may be less useful for choosing the right mechanism than the sciences of operations analysis and mathematical optimisation, especially when one considers that the world is a complex, open, place, in which the simplifying hypotheses of standard Game Theory seldom hold. The central question is, can we build systems to optimise the rules of a game with respect to a specific population of well-understood participants of bounded rationality, in order to extract performance that would be costly (or impossible) to achieve using the consultancy services of traditional Economists?
A SPACE OF SEALED-BID AUCTIONS
This paper concerns a space of different sealed-bid mechanisms for selling a single indivisible good. The classic sealed bid auctions are the first-and second-price auctions. In a first price auction, all bidders submit a secret ("sealed") bid to the auctioneer. The auctioneer assigns the good to the highest bidder, who pays the amount they have bid. A second-price auction is similar, except that the winner pays not his own bid, but that of the second highest bid. If the participants ("agents") are risk-neutral, are of known, fixed, number, have values for the good that are independent and identically distributed, then the Revenue Equivalence Theorem shows that the auctioneer should expect to make the same amount of money from both first-and second-price auctions, and indeed from almost any auction mechanism for which the winner is the agent that values the good most highly. The difficulty, of course, comes about when one of these hypotheses no longer holds -for example, if the agents are risk averse. The literature contains a collection of point results concerning the preferences of an auctioneer for first-or second-price auctions, but few systematic techniques for exploring these preferences. Those techniques that exist often rely on mathematical analyses that are critically dependent on simplifying assumptions or special symmetries. One of the main motivations for the work in this paper is to develop techniques that are more general and robust to alterations in preference or environmental changes.
We examine a space of sealed-bid auctions, including the firstand second-price auctions, defined as follows: Each agent bids for the good; the winner is the agent that bid the highest, and his payment is a linear combination of his own bid and that of the second highest bidder. We parameterise the participants in the game with respect to their number, risk attitudes, degree of common value for the good, and the degree of statistical correlation affiliation between their preferences. For each such parameterisation of the par-ticipants, we determine the strategy that optimally rational agents would play by using a Genetic Algorithm to evolve good bidding strategies competitively. An agent's bidding strategy is just a function from input signal to bid. We normalize so that all signals are in the interval [0, 1], and choose a space of piecewise linear bid functions determined by a set of "control values" y 1 , y 1 , . . . , y n (n = 5 in all the experiments mentioned here) -see Figure 1 Agents with randomly chosen signals for the good bid against each other in a sequence of auctions; the average value each agent extracts is its "fitness", and is used to select bidding strategies that "breed" preferentially into the next generation. This evolutionary process ensures that the model agents are acting in an incentivecompatible way: if a certain bidding behaviour makes more money on average, by exploiting foolish bidding behaviour on behalf of its peers, it is genetically selected for.
The simulation of the economic system described above was done in Java, and the evolutionary process run many times for 500 generations each time. This averaging over repeated runs allows us to smooth out random variation in performance due to the random selection of valuation, and allows us to account for the stochastic progress of evolution itself: if all runs of evolution end up producing the same fittest individual, up to some small variations, then we can be fairly sure that a global optimum has been found.
RESULTS
We find, first of all, that the evolutionary process successfully replicates results known from existing Auction Theory regarding the preference of a seller between first-and second-price auctions. For example, it is standard that an auctioneer facing independent risk-averse bidders with private values should run a second price auction, as is reflected in Figure 2 More interestingly, we discover types of environment in which both first-and second-price auctions are inferior to a hybrid auction in which the payment is a mix of first and second highest prices. For example, Figure 3 shows the situation when bidders are highly risk-averse, and have a common value coefficient of 0.9. In this case, the first-price auction is clearly superior to the second-price auction, but an auction in which the winner pays 0.3 times his own price plus 0.7 times the second price is superior to both first-and second-price auctions.
These results are important both for their purely auction-theoretic content -in that they establish the superiority of a new type of auction under certain assumptions on the bidders -and because they demonstrate the viability of an automated mechanism design methodology based on genetic algorithms for determining agents' responses to specific mechanisms.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper concerns a specific investigation into the use of genetic algorithms for determining optimal agent behaviour in each of a continuous family of auctions, including standard auctions that are in use today. The purpose of doing so is to allow a secondary layer of reasoning, regarding which such auction mechanism is most suitable for a given population of agents, to be fully or partially automated.
